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1. Introduction 
Hasok Chang “[complains] about…our [i.e., philosophers of science] habit of focusing on 
descriptive statements that are either products or presuppositions of scientific work, and our 
commitment to solving problems by investigating the logical relationships between these 
statements” (2014, 67–8). He argues philosophers of science should adopt “a change of focus 
from propositions to actions” (67). Chang suggests, “When we do pay attention to words, it 
would be better to remember to think of ‘how to do things with words’, to recall J. L. Austin’s 
(1962) famous phrase” (68).  
In this paper, I take Chang’s suggestion and argue that attending to Austin’s account 
of the things we do with words can help us understand the multiple goals of scientific 
practices, the speech acts appropriate to those goals, and the roles of nonepistemic values in 
evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. In §2, I give an overview of a few 
philosophers of science working on explanation who have shifted focus from propositions 
to explaining.1 I also briefly relate this work to a few themes in speech act theory. In §3, I 
give more details of Austin’s framework to highlight ways of evaluating speech acts beyond 
truth and falsity. In §4, I explore the multiple goals of scientific practice, especially goals 
related to conveying understanding to the general public and policymakers, and the speech 
acts appropriate to those goals. 
 
2. The things scientists do with words 
2.1 Explaining 
Consider some recent and not-so-recent work on scientific explanation. Andrea Woody’s 
defense of a functional perspective on explanation aims to motivate “a shift in focus away 
from explanations, as achievements, toward explaining, as a coordinated activity of 
communities” (2015, 80). In a similar spirit, Angela Potochnik argues that when looking at 
explanation, “sidelining the communicative purposes to which explanations are put is a 
mistake” (2016, 724). She emphasizes that explaining is a communicative act involving a 
speaker and audience made against a background that shapes the explanations offered. In so 
                                                        
1 I make no claims Chang influenced the work I canvas. 
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arguing, Potochnik deliberately recalls Peter Achinstein’s claim, “Explaining is an 
illocutionary act,” i.e., a speech act uttered by a speaker with a certain force and for a certain 
point (1977, 1). 
 These accounts share in common an emphasis on the importance of the aims of the 
speaker and audience, and thus the context of utterance in evaluating, to borrow terminology 
from Austin, the felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts. In particular, we might focus 
on the aims of the speaker and their audience in requesting and giving explanations, the time 
and location of an explaining speech act, and, following Woody, “what role(s) [explanations] 
might play in practice” (2015, 81). In focusing on the explaining act rather than the 
supposedly stable propositional content of an act of explanation, our attention is drawn to 
dimensions of evaluation beyond truth and falsity.  
On this last point, Nancy Cartwright argues that the functions of a scientific theory 
to “tell us…what is true in nature, and how we are to explain it…are entirely different 
functions” (1980, 159). Ceteris paribus laws used in scientific theories are literally false, but 
still do explanatory work. One way to understand Cartwright’s claim is that the speech act 
of describing the world truly and the speech act of explaining come apart from one another. 
In coming apart from one another and fulfilling different aims within scientific practice, 
descriptive and explanatory speech acts have different felicity conditions. For example, 
Potochnik (2016) examines the ways in which explaining increases understanding. But, 
Potochnik argues, what gets explained depends on a speaker’s and audience’s interests, and 
an explaining act’s success in generating understanding depends on the cognitive resources 
of the audience. As such, to evaluate any given communicative act of explaining requires 
attending to the epistemic and nonepistemic interests of speakers and audiences that form 
the background against which explanations are offered. This means evaluating explanatory 
speech acts solely in terms of truth or falsity is inapt. 
 
2.2 Multiple aims and the true/false fetish 
I do not think this focus on acts and away from the truth or falsity of descriptive statements 
is unique to philosophers of science interested in explanation. We see a similar shift in work 
on the so-called aims approach to values in science (e.g., Elliott and McKaughan 2014; 
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Intemann 2015). The aims approach shares in common with work on explaining a 
recognition that scientific practice aims at more than describing the world truly or falsely. 
Further, if some of those aims include things like making timely policy recommendations 
for decision makers or increasing public understanding of science, there is a role for 
nonepistemic values in parts of scientific practice. As Kevin Elliott and Daniel McKaughan 
put this point, “representations can be evaluated not only on the basis of the relations that 
they bear to the world but also in connection with the various uses to which they are put” 
(2014, 3). 
Why look to speech act theory to flesh out this picture about the multiple aims of 
scientific practice and their relationship to nonepistemic values? In part because speech act 
theory makes sense of the different uses to which one and the same sentence might be put 
depending on the aims of the speaker and audience and the context of utterance. In doing so, 
I think Austin is right that we can “play Old Harry with two fetishes…(1) the true/false 
fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish” (1962, 150). Austin was mainly content to play Old Harry 
with these fetishes to free philosophers from the grip of the so-called descriptive fallacy: the 
view "that the sole business, the sole interesting business, of any utterance…is to be true or 
at least false” (1970, 233). But I also think that in combating the descriptive fallacy and the 
true/false and fact/value fetishes, speech act theory motivates a constructive shift from the 
truth or falsity of descriptive statements to the things we do with words. 
Take Austin’s claim that evaluating apparently descriptive speech acts like “‘France 
is hexagonal,’” involves nonepistemic questions about who is uttering the statement, in what 
context, and with what “intents and purposes” (1962, 142). Rather than concluding the 
sentence is false and leaving it at that, Austin points out the different speech acts one can 
use such a sentence to perform, e.g., stating or interpreting or estimating. In determining the 
use the sentence is put to—with the help of context and by inquiring after the interests of the 
speaker and their audience—we might realize, irrespective of the sentence’s literal truth or 
falsity, “It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a geographer” (142). 
In other words, it serves the aims of the general, which, unlike the aims of the geographer, 
do not necessarily require a descriptively literal account of France’s shape. The statement 
might not aim to assert or describe literally, but do something else entirely. As such, 
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evaluating it along the lines of truth or falsity will miss something important about the aims 
of a speaker in uttering it.  
To expand on this picture, I turn to explicating Austin’s speech act theory. 
 
3. Austin’s speech act theory 
3.1 Performatives and constatives 
Austin first drew our attention to the things we do with words by discussing performative 
utterances. Austin says of these, “if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say 
that he is doing something rather than merely saying something” (1970, 235). Imagine a 
speaker utters ‘I promise to return my referee report in two weeks’ during the peer review 
process. In making this speech act, Austin claims the speaker does not describe an internal 
act she has concurrent to her utterance. Instead, in making that utterance, the speaker just is 
performing the act of promising thereby committing herself to actions related to the timely 
review of papers. 
 While promising has no special connection to truth and falsity, it still must meet what 
Austin calls felicity conditions to be happy or unhappy. In order to promise to return their 
referee report in two weeks successfully, the speaker must meet the sincerity condition of 
forming an intention to do so, even if they are not describing “some inward spiritual act of 
promising” (236). The speaker must also be in a position to follow through on their intention. 
Thus, there is unhappiness in the speech act if the speaker promises knowing full well other 
commitments will prevent her from returning the report in two weeks. The speaker must also 
have the authority to make a promise; unless authorized, an editor cannot promise on behalf 
of a reviewer. There should also exist a convention for making a promise in peer review 
contexts. Such conventions might allow the speaker to promise without uttering, ‘I promise,’ 
e.g., by accepting a request that reads, ‘In accepting this review assignment you commit to 
returning the referee report within such-and-such a time.’ 
 Austin first contrasts performatives with constatives, e.g., descriptive statements or 
assertions that aim to state something truly or falsely about the world, but which do not seem 
to perform an action. However, Austin claims describing or asserting is as much an action 
as promising, even if the felicity conditions for asserting are more closely connected to truth 
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or falsity. Consider an editor saying of a reviewer, ‘They review quickly, and I expect that 
they will return their review within two weeks.’ In saying this, the editor commits herself to 
providing evidence for her description of the reviewer as quick, and perhaps justifying her 
expectation that the reviewer’s past behavior provides good evidence for future behavior. As 
Robert Brandom puts this point, “In asserting a claim one not only authorizes further 
assertions, but commits oneself to vindicate the original claim, showing that one is entitled 
to make it” (1983, 641). That is, the utterer must be in a position of authority—here in an 
epistemic sense—with regards to the claim and be ready to perform further speech acts if so 
prompted. Other felicity conditions of assertions or descriptions include a sincerity 
condition: an editor uttering our example sentence should believe what they say. Finally, the 
context of an assertion also shapes its felicity conditions: an editor should utter the sentence 
in the appropriate circumstances, e.g., as a response to a worry about the speed of the review 
process. Should these conditions not be met, the speech act might be unhappy even if true. 
 
3.2 Locution and illocution 
Austin develops speech act theory to capture the similarities between performatives and 
constatives. Speech acts like promising and describing have three dimensions: the 
locutionary content, which is the conventional sense and reference of the uttered sentence; 
the illocutionary force, which is the use the utterance is put to; and the perlocutionary effects, 
which are intended and unintended “effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the 
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” (1962, 101).  
Austin’s points about the illocutionary dimension of a speech act most clearly capture 
how one and the same representation might be put to different uses depending on our goals, 
and how different uses have different felicity conditions despite sharing locutionary content. 
Consider the sentence, ‘This product contains chemicals known to the state of California to 
cause cancer.’ The locutionary content would just consist in the proposition expressed by 
the sentence as determined by the conventional sense and reference of the words. This 
content can be common to different illocutionary acts. Someone uttering the sentence could 
be describing a product, issuing a warning, or explaining why they do not use this particular 
product but another. Uttering the sentence with the force of a description, the force of a 
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warning, and the force of an explanation will have similar felicity conditions related to truth 
and falsity. Namely, the locutionary content should be true or approximately true for an 
utterance to count as a good description, a good warning, or a good explanation.  
However, a warning might be infelicitous in ways a description might not. For 
example, warnings might be issued only in the case in which some pre-determined level of 
significant risk at a certain level of exposure is met. In cases where such levels are not met, 
issuing a warning might be infelicitous. Consider also that uttering such a sentence with the 
force of an explanation might be called for only if, e.g., someone is prompted to justify their 
choice of a product that does not contain cancer-causing chemicals over a more easily 
available and cheaper product that does contain those chemicals. In these last two cases, 
nonepistemic reasons related to risk, cost-effectiveness, and so on can enter into the 
evaluation of the happiness of a warning or explanation.2   
Austin thinks attending to these points combats a form of abstraction that distorts our 
thinking about the felicity conditions of descriptive statements. He thinks that when 
examining statements, “we abstract from the illocutionary…aspects of the speech act, and 
we concentrate on the locutionary” (1962, 144–5). In so doing, “we use an over-simplified 
notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essentially it brings in the 
illocutionary aspect” (145). Such an approach focuses on “the ideal of what would be right 
to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c.” (145). But, as Austin 
claims, questions concerning correspondence with the facts brings with it the illocutionary 
aspect since truth or falsity does not attach to sentences or locutionary content. Instead, truth 
or falsity is related to particular things speakers do with sentences. Descriptions might be, 
strictly speaking, true or false, but not recommendations or explanations. In order to know, 
then, if evaluating a speech act along the true-false dimension is apt, we need to know the 
illocutionary force of that act. But to know the illocutionary force of the act requires we 
attend to context, including the aims of both speaker and audience, time and place of 
utterance, and conventions governing the specific speech situation. In this way, Austin 
                                                        
2 Any speech act will also have perlocutionary effects, and we might follow Heather Douglas (2009) 
and Paul Franco (2017) in focusing on the nonepistemic consequences of making false descriptions, 
giving bad warnings, or explaining unclearly. 
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argues context and aims are central to determining the illocutionary force of a speech act, 
and hence to evaluating its felicity or infelicity.  
 
4. Aims-approaches and speech act theory 
4.1 Explaining and understanding 
Scientific practice might seem to deal in paradigmatically constative speech acts, e.g., 
descriptions. Such speech acts are, to varying degrees, evaluable along dimensions of truth 
or falsity in ways we might question the relevance of speech act theory to philosophy of 
science. That is, we might say that scientific practice just is a case in which abstracting away 
from the illocutionary force of an utterance to focus on locutionary content is appropriate. 
For example, Austin says that “perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics books…we 
approximate in real life to finding” speech acts where focusing on the locutionary content is 
appropriate (1962, 145). If scientific practice aims at timeless truths holding across all 
contexts independent of the sorts of aims and interests of speakers and audiences necessary 
to evaluating the felicity or infelicity of speech acts, then it seems speech act theory is 
irrelevant to philosophy of science. 
 Yet, as Austin points out, “When a constative is confronted with facts, we in fact 
appraise it in ways involving the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with 
those that we use in the appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple 
situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether 
it is true or false” (141–2). Consider again ‘France is hexagonal.’ Austin asks, “How can one 
answer…whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is the 
right and final answer to the question of the relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to France. It is 
a rough description; it is not a true or false one” (142). Though rough, it is still open to 
evaluation. We can ask if it is in accord with conventions governing estimations and if this 
estimation serves the purposes and interests of the speaker and their audience at the time of 
utterance. ‘France is hexagonal’ can count as felicitous even if rough and not literally true 
because it aims at something other than truth. 
Austin claims that many of our apparently constative speech acts are evaluable along 
similar dimensions given that they also confront facts in similarly rough ways. McKaughan 
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makes a related point about scientific speech acts. He argues that certain speech acts central 
to scientific practice like “conjecturing, hypothesizing, guessing and the like often play a 
role in scientific discourse that serves neither to assert that an hypothesis is true nor to 
express such a belief” (2012, 89). Moreover, as mentioned in §2, the picture of scientific 
practice as concerned solely with the truth is challenged, among other places, in work on 
explanation, and also in values in science. For example, when looking at the role particular 
acts or patterns of explaining play in scientific discourse we might focus not on the 
locutionary content of an explanatory speech act, but on the ways “explanatory 
discourse…functions to sculpt and subsequently perpetuate communal norms of 
intelligibility” (Woody 2015, 81). In focusing on this aspect of explaining, we might find, 
for example, that “the ideal gas law’s role in practice is not essentially descriptive, but rather 
prescriptive; by providing selective attention to, and simplified treatment of, certain gas 
properties (and their relations) and ignoring other aspects of actual gas phenomena, the ideal 
gas law effectively instructs chemists in how to think about gases as they are characterized 
within chemistry” (82). In other words, the ideal gas law, in practice, does not have the force 
of a descriptive speech act, but lays down a rule of sorts guiding the investigation of gases.3 
The success of acts of explaining from this perspective will have less to do with accurately 
describing actual gases, but the way they facilitate, say, the education of new scientists or 
increase understanding of related phenomena, e.g., “by laying foundation for the concept of 
‘temperature’” beyond “the subjective, inherently comparative quality of human perception” 
(82). An act of explaining that fails to achieve pedagogical aims or fails to increase 
understanding of related phenomena might be infelicitous even if the locutionary content of 
that act confronts the facts in the right way to count as approximately true. 
On this point about the ways explanations might increase understanding without 
describing, Potochnik claims “that what best facilitates understanding is not determined 
solely by the relationship between a representation and the world” (2015, 74). An idealized 
explanation like the ideal gas law is not defective because it fails to fully describe all the 
                                                        
3 About universal generalizations Austin writes, “many have claimed, with much justice, that 
utterances such as those beginning ‘All…’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt a rule” 
(1962, 143). Austin does not fully endorse this suggestion. 
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possible causal factors at play in the behavior of actual gases. Though literally false, an 
idealization might be successful insofar as it “secure[s] computational tractability” or 
successfully isolates “all but the most significant causal influences on a phenomenon” (71). 
In so doing, we increase our understanding by facilitating “successful mastery, in some 
sense, of the target of understanding” or “by revealing patterns and enabling insights that 
would otherwise be inaccessible” (72). Indeed, pointing out all the ways in which the ideal 
gas law fails to hold for actual gases or is literally false as a description might hinder the use 
of explanations in scientific discourse to provide “shared exemplars that function as norms 
of intelligibility” (Woody 2015, 84).  
In a related vein, Potochnik argues, “Because understanding is a cognitive state, its 
achievement depends in part on the characteristics of those who seek to understand,” 
including both the speaker and the audience (2015, 74). In evaluating an act of explaining, 
we should look at how the speaker’s interest has shaped the focus of their explanation and 
also how the explanation increases an audience’s understanding, where this involves 
considering the audience’s interests in seeking an explanation. An explanation that fails to 
be relevant to the audience or fails to increase their understanding or guide their thinking 
about related phenomena, but that nonetheless has locutionary content that is approximately 
true, might count as infelicitous.  
 
4.2 Values and science 
On the views of explaining canvassed, the aims of generating literally true descriptions of 
the world come apart from, say, explaining and understanding the most important causal 
factors at play for a given phenomenon. Now, as the aims approach to the proper role for 
nonepistemic values in scientific practice emphasizes, explaining and describing do not 
exhaust the goals of scientific practice. The aims approach focuses on the ways “scientific 
decision-making, including methodological choices, selection of data, and choice of theories 
or models, are...a function of the aims that constitute the research context” (Intemann 2015, 
218). Given that the research context includes social, political, and moral considerations, the 
aims of science can just as well be understood in nonepistemic ways as it can be understood 
in epistemic ways. 
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 Consider, for example, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement on 
human-induced climate change. At the end of their statement, they claim, “The community 
of scientists has responsibilities to improve overall understanding of climate change and its 
impacts. Improvements will come from pursuing the research needed to understand climate 
change, working with stakeholders to identify relevant information, and conveying 
understanding clearly and accurately, both to decision makers and to the general public” 
(American Geophysical Union 2013). Here, I focus on the claim that scientists have 
responsibilities to improve the understanding of policymakers and the general public, and 
drawing upon the aforementioned work on explaining, think about how adopting this aim 
shapes the felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts directed at the audiences mentioned. 
 Notice that the position statement distinguishes the research necessary to understand 
climate change from conveying that understanding to policymakers and the general public. 
The sense in which these different activities come apart from one another and have different 
success conditions can be made sense of, in part, by focusing on the audience to whom 
scientists are speaking. We saw that for Potochnik (2016) understanding is a cognitive state 
that depends on the abilities and interests of those who are explaining and those to whom 
explanations are directed. In communicating to policymakers and the general public, 
scientists should consider the interests of the speaker in asking for an explanation as well as 
their level of knowledge regarding the phenomenon in question, in this case, climate change. 
In so doing, scientists might find that a description that aims to describe climate change in 
all its complexity might not serve these aims well. Instead, scientists might aim for an 
explanation that, though omitting descriptive complexity, draws upon models that represent 
those causal factors related to the audience’s interests in a way that is cognitively accessible 
and helps guide the public in thinking more generally about climate change.  
 On this point, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement maintains 
scientists ought to enlist the help of stakeholders in identifying potentially relevant 
information to their research. This is a point Intemann makes in developing the aims 
approach. She says of climate science, “[T]he aim is not only to produce accurate beliefs 
about the atmosphere, but to do so in a way that allows us to generate useful predictions for 
protecting a variety of social, economic and environmental goods that we care about” (2015, 
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219). In the view of the American Geophysical Union, in order to do this well, scientists 
ought to consult with relevant stakeholders and policymakers regarding what they value. 
Thus, for example, if stakeholders and policymakers communicate worries about extreme 
weather events and “how to adapt to ‘worst case scenarios,’ then models able to capture 
extreme weather events should be preferred” to those models that “anticipate slow gradual 
changes” (Intemann 2015, 220). Notice that in making such a decision, the grounds for 
choosing models able to represent aspects of climate change relevant to stakeholders’ 
interests are nonepistemic rather than epistemic, e.g., generating predictions useful for 
protecting goods the general public cares about. Insofar as the representations or 
explanations generated do not meet these goals because they are unrelated to stakeholders’ 
interests, the attendant speech acts might very well be infelicitous even if they describe some 
related phenomenon more or less accurately. 
 Both points about pitching explanations at a level that is cognitively accessible and 
choosing models for representing climate change phenomena in ways sensitive to 
stakeholders’ interests illustrate a point Austin makes about the importance of uptake to 
successfully performing a speech act. Austin claims, “Unless a certain effect is achieved, the 
illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed….I cannot be said to 
have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain 
sense….Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning 
and force of the locution” (1962, 116). In aiming to convey understanding through 
explaining relevant aspects of climate change to decision makers and the general public, a 
speaker should consider the interests, background knowledge, and cognitive resources of 
their audience. Insofar as scientists fail to do so in explaining to the general public, even if 
the locutionary content that comprises their speech act approximates truth, they will not 
secure uptake in the sense of generating understanding in their audience. As such, their 
speech act will be infelicitous.   
 Of course, a scientist’s explaining something to their audience will also be 
infelicitous if it is based on inaccurate information or extrapolates from what is known to 
their audience’s interests in unjustified ways. However, this does not mean that if scientists 
aim to convey understanding to the public they should stick solely to descriptive claims. As 
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Elliott emphasizes in discussing how scientists should best communicate uncertainty to the 
public, “It does little good to expect scientists to provide unbiased information to the public 
if their pronouncements are completely misinterpreted or misused by those who receive 
them” (2017, 89). Similarly, “members of the public might not be able to ‘connect the dots’” 
between scientists’ descriptive speech acts and the ways those are relevant to their interests; 
insofar as scientists do not explain with the aims of conveying understanding—which as 
Potochnik argues, comes apart from describing the world truly in all its complexity—the 
public “would be left wondering what [the descriptions] might mean” (88). Thus, if scientists 
are to meet responsibilities the American Geophysical Union claims they have with regard 
to conveying understanding to the general public, those scientists should communicate using 
speech acts best able to secure uptake in the general public. This involves considering the 
interests and cognitive resources of the general public in ways that shape the felicity 
conditions of the speech acts beyond truth and falsity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I argued speech act theory can tie together a few threads in recent work on explaining and 
values in science that share in common a shift in focus from descriptive propositions to 
things scientists do with words. Some of those things, like explaining, also seem the sorts of 
speech acts appropriate for fulfilling aims scientists have other than describing the world 
literally, like conveying understanding to the public and policymakers. Insofar as 
successfully fulfilling these aims involves explaining, and insofar as acts of explaining that 
secure uptake require attention to the nonepistemic interests and cognitive resources of 
speaker and audience, our attention is drawn towards ways explanatory speech acts can be 
happy or unhappy beyond describing truly or falsely. Future work will aim to delineate these 
felicity conditions in greater detail with an eye towards revealing further nonepistemic 
dimensions of evaluation. 
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